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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PARK CITY UTAH CORPORATJON, 
a corporation, and CITY 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. No. 15410 
ENSIGN COMPANY, a limited 
partnership, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
NATURE OF CASE 
This case is here on appeal from a partial summary 
judgment in the amount of $98,000 against the defendants, 
including the defendant Ensign Company. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Third District Court, Summit County, granted 
plaintiffs-respondents' motion for partial summary judgment 
in the sum of $98,000 on September 6, 1977. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant, Ensign Company, seeks a 
reversal of the partial summary judgment entered below and 
a remand to the trial court for trial and resolution of 
disputed issues of fact. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case is yet another volume in the saga 
involving the Park West ski resort, with which this Court is 
all too familiar.* It began in a straightforward manner in 
early 1971 with the filing of a complaint seeking partition 
of real estate in the Park West resort area, and seeking 
only such a partition.** 
Park West was conceived by Robert Major and 
Robert Ensign who in January 1967 entered into a contract by 
which they agreed to acquire land and develop and operate it 
as a resort, with Major to provide certain services and 
leaseholds and Ensign to pay for the land acquired. Major 
was to receive one-half of all land acquired. Subsequently, 
Major's interests were acquired by plaintiffs and Ensign's 
interests were acquired by defendants. 
As of 1971 sizeable tracts of land were either 
being acquired or had been acquired· from various parties. 
Much of the land was being acquired under executory real 
estate contracts. (See, e.g., R. 499, 508, 524-525, 530.) 
* Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 29 Utah 2d 184, 506 
P.2d 1274 (1973); Ski Park West, Inc. v. Major-Blakeney 
Corp., 30 Utah 2d 371, 517 P.2d 1325 (1974); Downey 
state Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 
1976); Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 548 P.2d 889 
(Utah 1976); Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 
556 P. 2d 1273 (Utah 1976). 
** Because of the undue size of the record, appellant 
furnishes herewith a separate appendix containing the 
material portions thereof. 
- 2 -
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However, at least one parcel, acquired from one Nielsen, 
was purchased by Major-Blakeney Corp.,* (see, Downey State 
Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 508(Utah1976) 
which gave back a purchase money mortgage (R. 534, App. soi. 
thereafter assigned to Dow~ey State Bank (R. 534, App. 50~. 
This appeal only involves the rights, if any, of the partieo 
following the foreclosure by Downey Stab~ Bank** of the 
mortgage as to a portion of the land originally included 
within the mortgage. 
The complaint, filed in February 1971, 2lleged ~ 
:-anuary 1967 agreement (R. 8-18, App. 6-25) between Major ar. 
Ensign which called upon Ensign to buy certain property and 
to allocate one-half of what was bought to Major. As 
alleged by the complaint, a dispute had arisen between the 
parties concerning this property division and the complai~ 
prayed, and only prayed, that the property rights of the 
parties be determined (R. 3-7, App. 1-5, see especially P. 
7, App. 5). 
On May 21, 1971, the district court (Harding, J,), 
upon stipulation, entered an order partitioning a substan-
tial portion of the land within the resort (R. 164-167, App. 
25-28). On July 23, 1971, counsel for the parties execut~ 
* Major-Blakeney Corp. was, along with the named plaintiff 
a corporation controlled by Robert Major and/or Jose~ 
Krofcheck. Its interest was assigned to plaintiffs. 
** See Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.~ 
507 (Utah 1976). 
- 3 -
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a stipulation agreeing to a partition of the remaining land 
(R. 203-207 I App. 29-32). 
The July 23, 1971 stipulation further provided 
that with respect to certain parcels "being acquired" by the 
parties under "executory real estate contracts" and in turn 
"being sold to third party purchasers," that, "for the 
protection of the existing original sellers and third party 
purchasers," the defendants would "apply third party purchaser 
proceeds to original seller obligations" to the extent they 
were "not heretofore assigned." 
Based upon that stipulation the district court 
executed, also on July 23, 1971, a "Judgment on Stipula-
tion" (R. 208-214, App. 32-35). Both the Stipulation and 
the Judgment were prepared by plaintiffs' counsel (R. 749, 
App. 54) on plaintiffs' counsel's letterhead. The relevant 
portions of the Stipulation read as follows: 
* 
8. That the parties hereto recognize that 
there are presently several executory real estate 
contracts involved in the Park City West project 
wherein property is being acquired for the project 
from original sellers and certain properties within 
these original acquisitions are being sold to third 
party purchasers. With respect to these transactions, 
it is hereby agreed and stipulated as follows: 
A. That for the protection of the 
existing original sellers and third party purchasers 
the defendants shall without restriction or limitation, 
except as herein provided, apply third party purchaser 
proceeds to original seller obligations. 
B. On receipt of third party proceeds 
not heretofore assigned* and pending disbursements 
Inserted by hand in the original. 
- 4 -
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thereof to original seller obligatio1,s, the defendanb 
shall deposit said proceeds in a separate trust acco~ 
the establishment, terms and conditions of withdrawal 
therefrom to be subject to the approval of plaintiff. 
It is the intent hereof that said proceeds are to be 
segregated from the general funds, accounts and 
expenditures of defendants and applied only to origi~ 
seller obligations, and are to be received and held~ 
trust by the defendants to insure performance of the 
obligations to original sellers. 
* * * 
The July 23rd Judgment reads, in relevant part: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that for the protectior 
of the existing original sellers and third party 
purchasers the defendants shall without restriction or 
limitation, except as herein provided, apply third 
party purchaser proceeds to original seller obligat~m 
A. On receipt of third party proceeds 
not heretofore assigned* and pending disbursements 
thereof to original seller obligations, the defendants 
shall deposit said proceeds in a separate trust acco~ 
the establishment, terms and conditions of withdrawal 
therefrom to be subject to the approval of plaintiff. 
It is the intent hereof that said proceeds are to be 
segregated from the general funds, acc0unts and expe~ 
ditures of defendants and applied only to original 
seller obligations, and are to be received and held~ 
trust by the defendants to insure performance of the 
obligations to original sellers. 
* * * 
It should be noted that despite the crucial 
importance of the status of "executory real estate contra~ 
"existing original sellers," "third party purchaser proceed: 
and whether they had been "heretofore assigned" neither the 
Stipulation nor the Judgment set forth in generality or 
detail what qexecutory real estate contracts" there were, 
* Inserted by hand in the original. 
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who the ''existing original sellers" were, what "third party 
purchaser proceeds" there were and to what extent they had 
been "heretofore assigned." 
This Stipulation and Judgment were entered on the 
record without the knowledge or consent of Ensign Company or 
Robert Ensign, the sole general partner elf defendant-appellant 
(R. 813-815, App. 65-67). Indeed prior to the entry of the 
Stipulation and Judgment, Ensign Company and Ensign had 
assigned all of their interest to the other defendants and 
were no longer in management of the project (R. 814, App. 66). 
In June 1974, the plaintiffs set in motion various 
proceedings which ultimately resulted in the judgment from 
which defendant now appeals. The first step was to obtain, 
ex parte, an order to show cause (R. 389, App. 36). Upon 
hearing the district judge refused to cite defendanLs for 
contempt and otherwise continued the matter without date (R. 
401). The matter was heard again on October 23, 1974, and 
the district court (Harding, J.) held that while it appeared 
that obligations due to sellers of the land had not in some 
cases been paid, plaintiffs had failed to show that defendants 
had received any third party purchaser proceeds which should 
have been applied to such obligations, or that such proceeds 
had been diverted. The district court also declined to 
enforce the underlying January 1967 agreement because "the 
provisions of those documents have not been incorporated in 
toto in the order or judgment in this cause, and are not now 
- 6 -
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before the court for consideration." The order to show 
cause was dismissed (R. 404-405, App. 37-39). 
The matter was heard again on February 27, 1975 ~ 
plaintiffs' motion (R. 601, App. 53) to enforce the Stipu~ 
and Judgment (in support of which plaintiffs filed a 158 
page affidavit, R. 441-598). At this time Dr . .:Yoseph Krofc 
claimed an interest as assignee of plaintiffs. Following 
this hearing the plaintiffs mysteriously obtained an "order' 
of April 8, 1975, without prior notice to defendants, and 
not received by defendants until May 16, 1975 (R. 808, App. 
62). For unexplained reasons the original April 8, 1975 
"order" is not in the record. Based upon that so-called 
"order" plaintiff obtained, also ex parte, a writ of execu-
tion against the defendants in the sum of $73,653.53 (R. 
426-427). No money judgment had then been entered. 
The~ parte April 8, 1975 "order," upon which 
plaintiffs obtained their execution, in relevant part reads: 
Plaintiffs' motion ... having come on for 
hearing . . . on February 27 . and 28, 1975 ... 
and the court ... having determined ... it [is] the 
duty of the defendants to pay and discharge the purchas 
money obligations on the land divided to plaintiff . · 
., some of which obligations are now in default; now, 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within 14 days from 
February 27, 1975 ... the defendants shall certify~ 
writing ... the amounts of principal and interest · · 
. currently due . . . upon original purchase money . 
obligations encompassing land divided to said plaint1fi 
. . . sufficient to obtain releases of property to sa~ 
plaintiff . . . , 
that plaintiffs' motion for leave to execuUi 
be, and the same is hereby, granted as to the amounts 
- 7 -
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herein referred to sufficient to discharge outstanding 
purchase money obligations ... , 
that should defendants fail to so provide the 
said balances currently due . . . or should there be a 
valid, verified difference between such balances, to 
that extent the balances certified to by the original 
purchase money obligees shall be taken as the correct 
amounts. (R. 800-801, App. 59-60) 
Defendants' counsel, when they learned of the so-
called April 8 "order" irrunediately sought to have the court 
vacate it and the writ of execution (R. 428-438, App. 39-
47). They were unsuccessful (R. 766, App. 54-55). 
The first time defendant-appellant received notice 
of the above-mentioned proceedings was when Robert Ensign 
was served in California with a notice of sister state 
judgment in the amount of $73,653.53 en September 28, 1976 
(R. 814-815, App. 67). Not only is Ensign Co. named as a 
defendant in this sister state judgment but also, for the 
first time, is Robert Ensign himself (R. 786, App. 58). 
As an attachment to defendant-appellant's motion for 
relief, appending the California filing, the April 8, 1975 
"order," as a xerox copy, first appears in the record (R. 
800-801, App. 59-60). 
The April 8, 1975 "order" is a curious document. 
It did not find that defendants were justly indebted to 
plaintiffs in a sum certain and it does not enter judgment 
for such sum. Instead, the "order" found that defendants 
had the obligation to discharge purchase money obligations 
encompassing the lands earlier divided to plaintiffs, and 
- 8 -
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gave permission to plaintiffs to execute in such amount. 
is these two provisions of the "order" that colored all 
subsequent proceedings in the case. Each judge who dealt 
with the case thereafter felt bound by the terms of the 
"order." 
!' 
This "order," prepared by plaintiffs' counsel, 
makes no attempt to deal with important terms of the July 
23, 1971 Stipulation and Judgment such as "existing original 
sellers," "executory real estate contracts" or "receipt of 
third party proceeds not heretofore assigned." 
More importantly, the transcripts of the Februaey 
27 and 28, 1975 hearings recited in the "order" provide no 
basis for the "order." The district court's rulings as 
reflected by those transcripts were that plaintiffs were 
free to file a motion for a dollar judgment (Tr. of 2-27-75 
at 57-58), the court having earlier in the hearing refus~ 
to consider plaintiffs' affidavit because it was hearsay~ 
incompetent (Tr. of 2-27-75 at 10, 11). 
Despite the fact that the April 8 "order" was n~ 
a money judgment, and despite the failure of defendants to 
produce certificates of amounts due on purchase money obli-
gations, and the absence of any certificates from original 
sellers as to amounts due, plaintiffs, ignoring the terms oi 
their own ex parte "order," obtained an execution in the sur 
of $73,653.53 (R. 426-427). 
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In response to various motions of appellant 
attacking the April 8, 1975 "order," the district court 
(Leary, J.) decided on June 21, 1977 to refuse to vacate 
the April 8, 1975 "order," but required a hearing on notice 
as to the amount of any money judgment and restrained the 
issuance of writs of execution (R. 883-887, App. 67-72). 
Plaintiffs and Krofcheck thereafter filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment (R. 919-920, App. 73-75), which 
motion applied solely to the Major-Blakeney land foreclosed 
under the Downey State Bank mortgage, and ultimately sold 
at sheriff's sale. 
The factual record made by plaintiffs in support 
of their motion was only that the land had been sold at a 
foreclosure sale and that it cost plaintiffs $98,000 to 
acquire it from the foreclosure sale purchasers (Krofcheck 
affidavit, R. 921-923, App. 75-77). The record is barren 
of any suggestion that there were any proceeds from "third 
party purchasers" of this land, or, if so, that they had 
not been "heretofore assigned," or that if received by defen-
dants that they were misapplied. Indeed the record suggests 
that this land was not the subject of an executory real estate 
contract (R. 534, App. 50A), and was never the subject of 
sales to third parties by the defendants. Plaintiffs' 
- 10 -
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earlier affidavit itself, which purports to show all third 
party purchasers, demonstrates that none of this land was 
sold to "third party purchasers."* It also shows that the 
largest parcel included in the July 23, 1971 Stipulated 
Judgment, the land acquired from Taylor Lott, was sold to 
one Gaskin, on a real estate contract, and that the contnct 
was assigned by the parties before the Stipulated Judgment 
was entered (R. 559-560, App. 51-52). This contract, by 
plaintiff's own showing, was 43 percent in amount of all 
"third party purchaser" contracts (R. 461, App. 47-48). T~ 
record further reflects that Ensign Co. and Ensign have h~ 
no dealings with this land and have collected no monies 
relating to it since long before the Stipulation and Judgmen 
(R. 954-955, App. 78-79). 
Nevertheless, the district court (Sawaya, J.) 
entered partial summary judgment for $98, 000 against defen· 
dants on September 6, 1977 (R. 1016-1018, App. 79-82). It 
is from this judgment and the prior interlocutory order 
leading up to it that appellant now seeks relief. 
* Major in his affidavit identified all third party pu~ 
chaser contracts (R. 448). It is apparent from those 
contracts that none of them involve the Major-Blaken~ 
land (R. 570-597). Plaintiffs, of course, never 
attempted to show that there were third party purchaser: 
of the Major-Blakeney land. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT IS NOT BOUND BY THE JULY 23, 1971 STIPULATION 
AND JUDGMENT BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS NOT A PARTY TO AND 
HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE STIPULATION. 
The April 8, 1975 "order" and September 6, 1977 
partial summary judgment from which defendant now appeal 
rest upon and purport to enforce the July 23, 1971 Stipula-
tion and Judgment. Although the defendants' attorney signed 
the stipulation and acquiesced in the judgment, the appellant 
had not authorized its ~ttorney to do so, and, indeed, had 
no knowledge of what was being done. The record reflects 
why this occurred. Robert Ensign had very early on assigned 
his individual interest to Ensign Company, a limited partner-
ship. Ensign Company thereafter assigned its interest to Ski 
Park City West in exchange for stock in that corporation (R. 
812-813, App. 64-65). By the end of June 1971, Ensign Company 
had exchanged its stock in Ski Park City West for stock in 
Life Resources, Inc., which then assumed management of the 
project in place of Ensign (R. 814, App. 66). Thus by 
July 23, 1971, Ensign Company, was to all appearances out of 
the litigation and the failure to keep it notified of develop-
ments becomes understandable. When derendant-appellant 
learned of the Stipulation and Judgment, it took immediate 
steps toward overturning them. Courts widely observe the 
common law rule that the attorney does not have 
implied authority to waive the substantative 
rights of the party by the compromise settlement 
agreement. 
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Grossman v. Will, 10 Wash. App. 141, 516 P.2d 1063, 1069 
(1973). 
In Radosevich v. Pegues, 133 Colo. 148, 292 P.2d 
741 (1956), the Colorado Supreme Court applied this rule a~ 
reversed a judgment based upon a stipulation of counsel of 
which the c 1 ien t had no knowledge. The court observed that 
(t]he general rule is that an attorney may not 
compromise his client's case without express 
authority. 
Id. 292 P.2d at 743. The court found the judgment entered 
in accordance with the unauthorized stipulation to be no 
barrier to reopening the case, and summarily overturned it. 
Accord,~., Bice v. Stevens, 160 Cal. App. 2d 222, 325 
P.2d 244 (1958); Robinson v. Hiles, 119 Cal. App. 2d 666, 
260 P.2d 194 (1953); Coon v. Ginsberg, 32 Colo. App. 206, 
509 P.2d 1293 (1973); Muncey v. Children's Home Finding & 
Aid Soc., 84 Idaho 14 7, 369 P. 2d 586 (1962); National Valve 
& Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 205 Okla. 571, 240 P.2d 766 (1951); 
Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 945 (1953). 
This Court has recognized that an attorney may 
not, without authorization, compromise his client's claims. 
In Rackham v. Rackham, 119 Utah 593, 230 P.2d 566 (1951), 
this Court said 
[we agree] that an attorney has no authority to 
enter into a stipulation relative to substantial 
rights of his client without his client's conse~ 
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Id. 230 P.2d at 570. Although this Court's statement in 
Rackham is dicta because in that case the client was present 
in court when her attorney made the stipulation and failed 
to object, it leaves no do~bt that had the client not 
acquiesced in the stipulation, she would not have been bound 
by it. This Court has thus approved the rule that a Califor-
nia court has called "almost universal." Bice v. Stevens, 
160 Cal. App. 2d 222, 325 P. 2d 244, 250 (1958). 
The Washington Court of Appeals has recently 
articulated the due process foundation of the rule. An 
attorney must have implied authority to enter into stipula-
tions and waivers concerning procedural matters or our legal 
system would collapse from inefficiency. But a client has a 
due process right guaranteed by the United States and Utah 
constitutions, U. S. Const. Amend. 14, Utah Const. Art. I, § 
7, to his day in court when substantial rights are at stake. 
An attorney "has no authority to waive any substantial 
rights of his client." In re Houts, 7 Wash. App. 476, 499 
P.2d 1276, 1279 (1972). The rule that an unauthorized 
settlement entered into by an attorney will not be enforced 
is a corollary of the client's due process right to have 
substantial claims determined in court if he desires. The 
mere employment of an attorney will not be taken as a waiver 
of that right. 
Because the defendant-appellant in the case before 
this Court had no knowledge of the unauthorized stipulation 
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affecting substantial rights of its entered into by its 
attorney, the lower court erred in issuing an order and 
partial surrunary judgment based upon the Stipulation and 
accompanying Judgment. This denial of defendant' s-appellan· 
due process rights alone is sufficient ground for this Com· 
to vacate the order and partial summary judgment below. At 
the very least, the question of whether the defendant-
appellant authorized its attorney to execute the stipulatior 
is an unresolved question of fact which should have barred 
the entry of a partial summary judgment. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ENTERING ,;,, SUMMARY JUDGMEN! 
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS WHEN THE RECORD FAILED TO SHOW 
THAT PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, AND WHERE CRUCIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXISTED. 
A. This Court Has Repeatedly Stressed The Fundamentai 
Rule That Any Material Issue of Fact Is An AbsoM 
Bar To summary Judgment. 
The district court, in granting plaintiffs' motior 
for partial surrunary judgment, ignored the stringent standarc 
imposed by Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
this Court's interpretation of that rule. Rule 56(c) pro-
vides in pertinent part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there are no genuine issues as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
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This rule, by its literal terms, places on the moving party 
the great burden of demonstrating the absence of any material 
issues of fact. Wright & Miller in their treatise neatly 
summarize the difficulty moving parties have in meeting this 
"burden of demonstrating". 
It is well-settled that the party moving for 
summary judgment has the burden of demonstrat-
ing that the Rule 56(c) test - "no genuine 
issue as to any material fact" - is satisfied 
and that he is entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law. The movant is held to a stringent 
standard. Before summary judgment will be 
granted, it must be clear what the truth is 
and any doubt as to the existence of a genuine 
issue of material fact will be resolved against 
the movant. The burden is on the movant, the 
evidence presented to the court always is con-
strued in favor of the party opposing the motion 
and he is given the benefit of all favorable 
inferences that can be drawn from it. Finally, 
the facts asserted by the party opposing the 
motion, if supported by affidavits or other 
evidentiary material, are regarded to be true. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil, § 
2727 at 524-30 (1973) and authorities cited therein. This 
Court has repeatedly expressed similar, if not identical, 
sentiments regarding the caution with which the district 
courts should approach the summary judgment procedure. For 
example, in Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty 
Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 (1965), 
the Court held: 
The summary disposal of a case serves a salutary 
purpose in avoiding the time, trouble and expense 
of a trial when it is justified. But unless it 
is clearly so, there are other evils to be 
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guarded against. A party with a legitimate cause 
but who is unable to afford an appeal, may be ' 
turned away without his day in court; or when an 
appeal is taken, if a reversal results and a 
trial is ordered, the time, trouble and expense 
is increased rather than diminished. It is to 
avoid these evils and to safeguard the right of 
access to the courts for the enforcement of 
rights and the remedy of wrongs by a trial, and 
by a jury if desired, that it is of such impor-
tance that the court should take care to see that 
the party adversely affected has a fair oppor-
tunity to present his contentions against precipi· 
tate action which will deprive him of that privi· 
lege. 
398 P.2d at 688. Accord, Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 
(Utah 1976); Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 
350, 353 P.2d 460 (1960). 
Furthermore, the cases in this state are legion 
that echo the following statement from Bullock v. Deseret 
Dodge Truck Centers, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559, 561 
(1960): 
A summary judgment must be supported by evide::ce, 
admissions and inferences which, when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the loser shows that; 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Such showing must preclude 
all reasonable possibility that the loser could, 
if given a trial, produce evidence which would 
reasonably sustain a judgment in hi~ favor. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396, 397 (1963) 
(summary judgment a "harsh remedy"; should be granted only 
when viewing evidence in light most favorable to non-moving 
party "it is evident beyond a reasonable possibility that i' 
given a trial he could not produce evidence to sustain a 
- 17 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
judgment more favorable to him."); Russell v. Park City 
Utah Corp., 29 Utah 2d 184, 506 P.2d 1274 (1973); Christensen 
v. Financial Service Co., 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010 
(1963); Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 
266 (1962); Green v. Garn, 11 Utah 2d 375, 359 P.2d 1050 
(1961). 
In light of these cases, it is clear that a court 
must be very circumspect in granting a summary judgment 
against a party, especially when the losing party has 
asserted factual matters that contravene the assertion of 
the other party and, if true, would alter the outcome of the 
case. 
The record as made below not only reveals the 
existence of material controverted issues of fact, it also 
reveals that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they were 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
B. The Judgment Below Resulted From An Erroneous Inter-
pretation of the Stipulation and Judgment of July 23, 
1971. 
In entering the partial summary judgment against 
appellant, the court below adopted plaintiffs' theory that 
the Stipulation and Judgment of July 23, 1971 imposed upon 
defendants the duty in all events to pay for the land divided 
to plaintiffs. This theory, long urged by plaintiffs, first 
crept into the court's rulings by way of the ~ parte "order" 
of April 8, 1975, and thereafter became a fixture in each 
subsequent ruling of the district court. 
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Once the ex parte "order" of April 8, 1975 inter-
preted the July 23, 1971 Stipulation and Judgment as 
authorizing a judgment for money damages, each district 
judge felt unable to depart from that interpretation withou 
overruling a fellow district judge. Accordingly, Judge 
Sawaya entered partial summary judgment against the defen-
dants, thus permitting appellant to seek reversal of the 
erroneous interpretation made below. 
This Court must now decide whether the district 
court's interpretation of the July 23, 1971 Stipulation and 
Judgment authorizing an award of money damages was correct 
or erroneous. The record compels the conclusion that the 
district court's interpretation was erroneous. 
1. The lower court failed to observe the 
settled rules that a stipulated judgment 
should be strictly construed and that it 
should be construed against the party 
who drafted it. 
The April 8, 1975 "order" and the partial summary 
judgment authorizing an award of money damages against the 
defendant-appellant rely on and purport to construe the 
stipulated judgment of July 23, 1971. The construction of 
the Stipulated Judgment as authorizing an award of money 
damages, however, is wholly without support from the record 
and violates settled rules governing the construction of 
stipulated judgments. 
When a party stipulates to a judgment he waives 
his right to have his claims and defenses adjudicated, 
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and usually, as in the present case, agrees to a compromise. 
Because the Stipulated Judgment issues solely upon a stipu-
lation and does not involve adjudication on the merits, the 
judgment must be strictly construed to ensure that it is not 
used to bind a party to more than he, by stipulation, agreed. 
American Radium Co. v. Hipp. Didisheim Co., 279 F. 601, 603 
(S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd, 279 F. 1016 (2d Cir. 1922). As the 
Tenth Circuit has said, when a judge enters a stipulated 
judgment, he "merely [exercises] an administrative function 
in recording what [has] been agreed to between the parties." 
Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Gilmore, 167 F.2d 324, 330 (10th 
Cir. 1948). The Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated this rule 
even more forcefully: 
Courts are entirely without authority to enter 
any judgment by agreement other than a judgment 
falling strictly within the stipulation of the 
parties. 
Insurance Service Co. v. Finegan, 196 Okla. 441, 165 P.2d 
620 (1946). 
When the lower court construed the Stipulated 
Judgment to authorize an award of money damages against the 
defendant-appellant, it violated the rule that stipulated 
judgments should be narrowly construed to fall within the 
stipulation. Nothing in the terms of the Stipulation itself 
or in the record indicates that the defendant-appellant 
agreed to have a money judgment entered against it. Indeed, 
the Stipulation never mentions money damages. The lower 
court clearly exceeded its authority when it construed the 
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Stipulated Judgment broadly as authorizing an award for m~ 
damages when the Stipulation does not even hint that the 
defendant-appellant agreed to a money damage judgment. 
The United States Supreme Court has recently 
applied the rule that a consent judgment must be strictly 
construed. In rejecting the government's effort to impose, 
broad construction upon a consent decree, the court noted 
the rule's due process basis: 
For these reasons, the scope of a consent 
decree must be discerned within its four 
corners, and not by reference to what might 
satisfy the purposes of one of the parties 
to it. Because the defendant has, by the 
decree, waived his right to litigate the 
issues raised, a right guaranteed to him by 
the Due Process Clause, the conditions upon 
which he has given that waiver must be 
respected, and the instrument must be con-
strued as it is written, and not as it 
might have been written had the plaintiff 
established his factual claims and legal 
theories in litigation. 
United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971). A, 
in Armour, the appellant in the case at bar waived* its due 
process right to litigate the claims against it and agreed 
to a Judgment to terminate the proceedings. The Judgment 
must therefore be strictly construed -- "the conditions upo: 
which he gave that waiver must be respected . . " Id. Th~ 
broad construction that the lower court applied violated 
this rule and compromised the appellant's due process right 
* If it is bound by its attorney's conduct, see Point Ii 
supra. 
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The plaintiffs' contention that the defendant-appellant 
stipulated to have a money judg~ent entered against it 
finds support only in the broadest, most strained construction 
of the Stipulation and Judgment. The lower court erred when 
it made such a construction. 
Another rule of construction of a stipulated 
judgment is also widely accepted -- that it should be con-
strued as a contract: 
It is true, as pointed out by the Court of 
Appeals, that a stipulated judgment is not 
considered to be a judicial determination; 
"rather it is a contract between the 
parties," State v. Clark, 79 N.M. 29, 439 
P.2d 547 I 549 (1968) 
Owen v. Burn Const. Co., 90 N.M. 297, 563 P.2d 91, 93 
(1977). Accord, Ex parte Ferrigno, 22 Cal. App. 2d 472, 
71 P.2d 329, 330 (1937); Greeson v. Greeson, 208 Okla. 457, 
257 P.2d 276, 278 (1953); Insurance Service Co. v. Finegan, 
~ 196 Okla. 441, 165 P.2d 620 (1946); Grayson v. Pure Oil Co., 
~ 189 Okla. 550, 118 P.2d 644, 648 (1941); Washington Asphalt 
Co. v. Harold Kaeser Co., 51 Wash. 2d 89, 316 P.2d 126, 127 
(1957); 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments § 1082 at 140 (1969). 
10: Like any other contract, the Stipulation and 
;h< Judgment should be read to determine if their meaning can 
be ascertained. If the language is clear and unambiguous, 
~ the intent of the parties must be ascertained from the 
language and terms of the agreement. Owen v. Burn Const. 
Co., supra. If the language is unclear or ambiguous the 
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judgment may be read in light of the record if the record 
gives it meaning, Snow v. West, 37 Utah 528, 110 P. 52 
(1910), and the familiar rule for the interpretation of 
contracts that they are to be construed against the draftk 
party should be applied. See Bryant v. Deseret News Pub. c 
120 Utah 241, 233 P.2d 355 (1951). Nothing in the record 
reveals that by the language used in the Stipulated Judgrnen' 
the appellant agreed to the entry of a money judgment 
against it. And when the language of the Stipulation and 
Judgment is construed against the plaintiffs-respondents, 
whose attorneys drafted it, the construction that the lower 
court adopted is obviously erroneous. 
Because of these numerous errors in construing 
the Stipulated Judgment and the concomitant invasion of 
the defendant's due process rights, the lower court's 
April 8, 1975 "order" and the partial summary judgment 
following it must be reversed. Appellant in what follows 
will demonstrate how the court below should have construed 
the Judgment of July 23, 1971 in light of the principles 
governing the construction of such documents. 
2. The Judgment of July 23, 1971 applied only 
to that land which was covered by executon: 
real estate contracts, and the evidence 
shows that the land in question was not 
so covered. 
This Court's duty as set forth, supra, is to 
interpret the July 23, 1971 Stipulated Judgment from within 
its four corners if possible, and if not then in light of 
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the record as made at the time it was entered. The Judgment 
standing alone is ambiguous as to what land it concerns. It 
reads, in relevant part, "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that for 
the protection of the existing original sellers . • . the 
defendants shall . . . apply third party purchaser proceeds 
to original seller obligations" (emphasis supplied). 
The Court will note that "existing original 
sellers" and "original seller obligations" are indefinite. 
Nowhere in the Judgment are these phrases defined. Thus the 
four corners of the Judgment are insufficient to interpret 
it. The Court would be in the dark as to the intent of the 
parties and the district court in using these ambiguous 
words if it were not for the Stipulation of the same date. 
That Stipulation, while not a model of clarity and precision, 
casts revealing light. 
The Stipulation, in relevant part, reads: 
That the parties hereto recognize that there 
are presently several executory real estate 
contracts . • . wherein property is being acquired 
for the project from original sellers and certain 
properties within these original acquisitions are 
being sold to third party purchasers. With 
respect to these transactions, it is hereby agreed 
and stipulated as follows: 
A. That for the protection of the existing 
original sellers . [etc., as in the Judgment]. 
One can easily see what happened. The prefatory 
language quoted above as found in the Stipulation did not 
get repeated in the Judgment. This language which appears 
in the Stipulation (prepared and executed simultaneously 
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with the Judgment) makes clear what the parties and the 
court below* intended. 
It must be remembered that the parties, plaintiff 
and defendants, were assembling sizeable land holdings in 
the Park West area. Much of it they were in the process of 
acquiring by executory real estate contracts from the 
original landowners. Some had been acquired by deed. As oi 
the time of the Stipulation and Judgment of July 23, 1971, 
the parties had, in turn, entered into contracts to sell 
some portions of all this land to others, called third part: 
purchasers by the parties. 
The obligation to collect and apply proceeds on~ 
affected those lands which the parties were in the process 
of buying under an executory real est~te contract (and, of 
course, where the parties had contracted with others to sel. 
the same land, or a portion of it, and had not as signed tha• 
contract). For example if the plaintiffs had been the 
"buyer" under an executory real estate contract of Blackacr: 
from Mr. S and had in turn agreed with Mr. B, to sell Mr. B 
Blackacre (and had not assigned the contract with Mr. B) 
then, and only then, would defendants, under the Stipulatio: 
and Judgment, have the obligation to apply proceeds receivec 
from Mr. B to the contract with Mr. S. 
* There is no indication that the court below declined W 
enter judgment in the form presented to it by counsel. 
Just the opposite, as both S tipula ti on and Judgment were 
prepared by plaintiffs' counsel (and on his letterhead). 
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But the obligation of defendants never could arise 
unless indeed there had been in existence as of July 23, 
1971, an executory real estate contract with respect to the 
Major-Blakeney land which was foreclosed by Downey State 
Bank. Plaintiffs' submittals fail to show any such 
executory real estate contract. Rather, it appears that 
Major-Blakeney purchased the land and executed a mortgage 
deed. There simply was no executory real estate contract. 
Thus, by the very terms of the Stipulation and Judgment no 
obligation was imposed on defendants to collect and apply 
proceeds respecting that land. 
The court below failed to apply the terms of the 
Stipulation and Judgment of July 23, 1971 when it entered 
partial summary judgment against appellant. The district 
court fell into this error because it felt bound by the 
April 8, 1975 ex parte "order," which "order" applied 
plaintiffs' interpretation, an interpretation erroneous 
because it fails to take into consideration the language of 
the Stipulation and Judgment. 
3. The Judgment of July 23, 1971 applied only 
to that land from which there were proceeds, 
and the evidence fails to show that there 
were any such proceeds as to the land in 
question. 
Both plaintiffs and the court below have misread 
the Stipulation and Judgment in another respect. That is, 
they assumed that plaintiffs did not need to show the 
existence of proceeds from third party sales contracts for 
the Major-Blakeney land. 
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The Stipulation and Judgment both recite that the 
collection and application of proceeds obligation was ~ 
the protection of the existing original sellers and third 
party purchasers." The only way both original seller and 
third party purchaser could be protected was, to elaborate 
on the example given above, to use the proceeds from Mr. B, 
who was buying Blackacre from the parties, to reduce the 
indebtedness to Mr. S, who was selling Blackacre to the 
parties. If, for instance, Mr. B's payments were used to 
pay Mr. X for Whi teacre, neither Mr . B nor Mr . S would be 
protected, but would be prejudiced instead. 
It follows that if there were no third party 
purchasers of the Major-Blakeney land (putting aside, for 
argument, the distinction between a mortgage and an execu-
tory real estate contract) , then defendant-appellant had no 
duty under the Stipulation and Judgment to apply any pro-
ceeds to the Major-Blakeney land. In this respect plain-
tiffs-respondents have failed to meet a major burden impose( 
by Rule 56 (c) . Plaintiffs-respondents nowhere in the recorc 
established that there were any such third party purchasers 
of the Major-Blakeney land. Quite the contrary. The recorc 
made by Major shows affirmatively that all of the third 
party purchase contracts dealt with land other than the 
Major-Blakeney land foreclosed by the bank (R. 448, 570-5911 
Thus it was error for the district court to enter 
judgment against defendants for $98,000, as plaintiffs' 
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proof in support of this figure showed only that this was 
the sum plaintiffs paid to acquire that portion of the 
Major-Blakeney land which was foreclosed by the bank. Under 
plaintiffs'-respondents' own proof no duty arose as to this 
land as no procee~s were available to be applied upon it. 
For this reason alone the Court should reverse the partial 
suI!UTiary judgment. 
4. The Judgment of July 23, 1971 applied only 
to the extent that proceeds had not been 
"heretofore assigned" and there is an 
unresolved question of fact whether the 
proceeds had been "heretofore assigned." 
The judgment against defendants for 
$98,000 was erroneously entered for yet another reason. 
Plaintiffs-respondents failed to adduce any evidence that 
defendants received any third party proceeds which had not 
been "heretofore assigned." All that plaintiffs'-respondents' 
factual submissions, including the Major affidavit, demon-
strate is that there were a half dozen or so contracts 
outstanding to third party purchasers relating to land other 
than that foreclosed by the bank. These factual submissions 
purport to show only what was payable, not what was in fact 
paid by those purchasers. The duty to apply funds arises by 
the terms of the Stipulation and Judgment only to proceeds, 
that is money actually received by defendants. While it may 
well have been the case that there were over $660,000 in 
payables there is no hint in the record as to what was 
actually received by defendants. The Stipulation and Judgment 
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say defendants "shall ... apply third party purchaser 
proceeds;" that "in receipt of third party proceeds .. 
said proceeds are to be segregated . . . and applied only to 
original seller obligations." Plaintiffs'-respondents' 
factual submissions fail to show what was received by 
defendant-appellant. Defendant-appellant's affidavit shows 
that it never received any such proceeds (R. 954-955, App. 7 
Thus, at the very least there must be a trial of this dis-
puted issue of fact -- were any proceeds received. 
Furthermore if the proceeds had been "heretofore 
assigned" then by the express terms of the Stipulation and 
Judgment no duty arose. Plaintiffs'-respondents' own affi-
davit shows affirmatively that the land being acquired from 
a Taylor Lott by executory real estate contract was in lar~ 
part being resold by the parties to one Reed Gaskin for 
$288,000, or 43% of all the third party purchaser payables. 
Major's affidavit also shows that the Gaskin contract was 
"heretofore assigned" (R. 559-560, App. 51-52). Thus 
there was never available to the defendant-appellant a 
major portion of the receivables. 
In effect, plaintiffs' argument below was, and 
must be now, that unavailability of proceeds is no excuse. 
To reach this result plaintiffs-respondents not only ignore 
the plain language of the Stipulation and Judgment, which 
impose a duty only with respect to proceeds -- not accounU 
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receivable -- but they strain entirely out of shape other 
portions of the Stipulation and Judgment. 
For instance plaintiffs-respondents have con-
sistently asserted below that paragraph B of the Judgment 
imposes a duty to pay off all encumbrances in all events. 
It clearly does not. It only provides,"In the event of 
default by a third party purchaser, the property shall be 
resold and the proceeds thereof applied to any outstanding 
original seller obligation .... " If upon default and 
resale there is a deficiency, then and only then shall the 
deficiency be the obligation of defendant-appellant. 
Plaintiffs-respondents have utterly failed to show any 
default of either a contract respecting the Major-Blakeney 
land, or of a contract "not heretofore assigned." Not only 
is no default shown, but neither is any resale or any 
deficiency upon such resale. Thus paragraph B cannot support 
the summary judgment because of plaintiffs'-respondents' 
failure to prove any of the elements necessary to be proved 
under its language. 
III. THE APRIL 8, 1975 "ORDER" WAS BOTH WITHOUT WARRANT 
FROM THE RECORD AND A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS. 
The April 8, 1975 "order," was obtained by plain-
tiffs-respondents, ex parte, following hearings on February 
27 and 28, 1975. This so-called "order" tainted all subse-
quent proceedings in one very important respect. The 
"order'' in effect substituted plaintiffs'-respondents' 
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erroneous theory (that all they need show was that amounts 
were due on purchase money obligations to the original 
sellers to the parties) in place of the terms of the Stipu-
lation and Judgment. The "order" thus precluded all distric 
judges who later heard this matter from examining the under-
lying issues of what lands were covered by executory real 
estate contracts, what third party purchase proceeds were 
received by defendant-appellant, which of those proceeds had 
theretofore been assigned, and the manner in which the 
proceeds, if any, were applied.* 
A. The April 8, 1975 "Order" Is Not Supported By 
The Record And Was Therefore Erroneous. 
The April 8, 1975 "order" came into being because 
plaintiffs'-respondents' first attempt to raise the issue of 
defendants' purported failure to obey the Stipulation and 
Judgment, by way of an order to show cause, was resoundingly 
rebuffed by the district court (R. 404-405, App. 37-39). 
Plaintiffs-respondents then filed a motion to enforce the 
Judgment of July 23, 1971 (R. 601, App. 53) supported by 
the massive Major affidavit (R. 441-598) . The matter then 
came on for hearing on February 27, 1975, a transcript of 
which has been included in the record on appeal. 
* It is interesting to note that if the April 8 "order" 
measure of damages was followed, plaintiffs' damages 
should have been the amount, at most, of Downey State 
Bank's foreclosure judgment, $37,744.22 (R. 433-434). 
If the April 8 "order" is valid and binding, then the 
partial summary judgment for $98,000 is clearly 
erroneous as it is based upon the amount Krofcheck paid 
to acquire the land following the sheriff's sale. 
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At that hearing plaintiffs-respondents proposed to 
show the dollar amounts required to have five parcels 
released to them free and clear, relying upon various 
documents attached to Major's affidavit (Tr. 4). Defendants' 
counsel correctly objected to their hearsay character and 
irrelevance (Tr. 4-5). Robert Major was called as a witness, 
but his attempt to repeat on the witness stand the substance 
of his affidavit was prevented by timely objection. The 
court correctly ruled that Major only had hearsay to offer 
(Tr. 10). Defendants at this time also raised the issue of 
what payments had actually been made on third party purchaser 
contracts and received by defendants (Tr. 11). The district 
judge repeatedly ruled that he had only hearsay and incompe-
tent matter before him and that it would be error to rely 
upon it (Tr. 10, 11). The district judge then ruled that 
what we will need to do, is to have the records 
of those who are supposed to receive the monies 
on these third party purchase contracts, the 
records on them, and see what monies have been 
received. And if they haven't been collected 
why they haven't been collected. And then 
whatever has been collected, see how it has 
been applied. (Tr. 13.) 
The court at this stage understood, as can be 
seen, the legal significance of the receipt of third party 
purchase obligations, and further suggested to plaintiffs-
respondents' counsel that he use the discovery process to 
learn the extent of those receipts (Tr. 14) and agreed that 
plaintiffs-respondents were also entitled to discover what 
defendants' records showed as remaining unpaid on purchase 
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money obligations (Tr. 16). The district judge then asked 
how long it would take defendants' counsel to gather the twc 
classes of information. 
The Court: Consult with your clients and 
tell me how much time you need . 
.Mr. Cook [defendants' counsel] : May we have 
two weeks, your Honor? 
The Court: Yes, you may. 
The Court: And you have given them your 
figures that you claim are owing on them? 
Mr. Strong: Yes. 
The Court: They are going to check and see 
whether or not they can admit those figures. And if 
they deny them, then they will give us the figures they 
claim are the ones, if any, or whether they have been 
paid (Tr. 17-18). 
(It should be noted that earlier in this hearing 
plaintiffs-respondents had set out the amounts they claimed 
to be due on five parcels of real estate. Among them was ar. 
asserted payable to Downey State Bank of $28,600. Tr. 14.) 
The most that can be asserted from this record is 
that the district court entered a discovery order, that 
defendants were (a) to furnish the receipts records for the 
third party purchaser contracts and (b) to admit or deny 
plaintiffs'-respondents' figures for amounts due from the 
parties on purchase money obligations. No sanctions 
were incorporated into this order . 
.Much later on in the hearing, after having dis-
cussed other unrelated matters and other lawsuits involving 
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the same parties, the court turned again to this case, 
commenting: 
You entered into a stipulated judgment on 
that matter, and that judgment should stand. Now, 
they're [plaintiffs] going to come in with a motion for 
a dollar judgment with respect to your failure to 
perform under that judgment? 
Mr. Strong: Yes (Tr. 57). 
Thus the matter rested at the conclusion of the hearing. 
Plaintiffs-respondents were to obtain discovery and were 
free to move for a dollar judgment again. 
The attorneys and the court met again on February 
28, 1975, and a transcript of that hearing is also part of 
the record on appeal, even though it is captioned for 
another civil action. That hearing did not concern this 
case in any fashion. 
What warrant in this record was there for the 
ex parte April 8, 1975 "order"? What justification for 
imposing upon defendants "the duty . . . to pay and discharge 
the purchase money obligations on the land divided to plain-
tiff. ."? What justification for the order that "within 
14 days from" February 27, 1975,* "defendants shall certify 
in writing . . . the amounts of principal and interest .• 
currently due and owing upon original purchase money obli-
gations . [of] . land divided to said plaintiff 
. ?" Where in the record of proceedings prior to the 
* Remember, that date of this "order" was April 8, 1975, 
nearly 40 days from February 27. 
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"order" was plaintiff given "leave to execute ... as to 
the amounts herein referred to sufficient to discharge 
outstanding purchase money obligations ... "? 
To ask these questions is to answer them. The 
record furnishes no justification, no warrant, for the 
ex parte "order" of April 8, 1975. 
B. The "Order" of April 8, 1975 Deprived Appellant cl 
Property Without Due Process. 
The April 8, 1975 "order" obtained ex parte by 
plaintiffs was first brought to defendant's counsel's atten· 
tion on May 16, 1975 (R. 808, App. 62). Despite various mot 
seeking to vacate the "order," the April 8, 1975 "order" was 
stubbornly clung to by every judge who thereafter heard the 
matter, resulting in a uniform refusal to look behind the 
"order" to the terms of the Stipulation and Judgment. The 
April 8, 1975 "order" thus became the "law of the case" and 
the ultimate justification for the entry of the partial 
summary judgment against appellant. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 5(a) and 
77(d) incorporate the fundamental notion of due process 
notice and hearing. Thus Rule 5 (a) provides, "Except as 
otherwise provided in these rules, every order required by 
its terms to be served . . . shall be served upon each of 
the parties . Rule 77(d) in turn provides: 
At the time of presenting any written order . 
. . . to the court for signing, the party seeking 
such order . shall deposit with the clerk 
sufficient copies thereof for mailing as here-
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inafter required. Irrunediately upon the entry 
of an order . . the clerk shall serve a notice 
of entry by mail in the manner provided for 
in Rule 5 upon each party . . 
These explicit provisions were ignored to defen-
dants'-appellant's detriment in this case. Not only the 
Rules but the Utah Constitution were ignored. Utah consti-
tution, Article I, § 7, reads, "No person shall be deprived 
of . property, without due process of law." 
This fundamental constitutional right has long 
been held to require notice and hearing and an order or 
judgment which is rendered upon the record thus made. 
Many attempts have been made to further define 
"due process" but they all resolve into the 
thought that a party shall have his day in court 
-- that is each party shall have a right to a 
hearing before a competent court, with the 
privilege of being heard and introducing evi-
dence to establish his cause or his defense, 
after which comes judgment upon the record 
thus made. 
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314, 316 (1945). 
The Court has long held that ex parte orders 
depriving a party of substantial rights are violative of the 
due process clause. 
Where a court has jurisdiction of a cause and of 
the parties, there are undoubtedly various orders 
which the court in the progress of the cause may 
make without notice to the adverse party and be 
of binding effect, in the absence of a motion or 
notice to vacate or modify the order. But such 
doctrine applies only to such orders as the court 
has power to make without notice. It does not 
apply to a purported ex parte order whose effect 
is to deprive a party of property without due 
process of law . 
Cox v. Dixie Power Co., 81 Utah 94, 16 P.2d 916, 920-921 
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(1932). See also, Hilton Bros. Motor Co. v. District Court 
82 Utah 372, 25 P.2d 595 (1933); Morris v. Public Service 
Com'n, 7 Utah 2d 167, 321 P.2d 644, 646 (1958). 
Because the ~ parte "order" of April 8, 1975 was 
obtained in flagrant disregard of appellant's due process 
I 
rights, and because it is so utterly lacking in support froc 
the record, this Court should reverse that "order." Rever-
sal of that "order" also requires reversal of the partial 
summary judgment because that partial summary judgment was 
predicated upon that "order." 
CONCLUSION 
As shown above, reversal of the partial summary 
judgment is required for three basic reasons. First, 
appellant is not bound by the Stipulation and Judgment 
of July 23, 1971, that the partial summary judgment purport: 
to enforce. Secondly, and entirely independently of the 
first ground, the district court so misconstrued the Stipu· 
lation and Judgment of July 23, 1971 that it ignored 
respondents' failure to meet its burdens imposed by Rule 56 
of demonstrating a right to judgment upon uncontested facts. 
Thirdly, and again entirely independently of any other grom 
d ii the partial summary judgment was predicated upon an "or er 
so erroneous and such an egregious affront to appellant's 
due process rights that it should be reversed. 
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The Court should reverse the partial summary 
judgment and the "order" of April 8, 1975 and remand the 
matter to the district court for trial upon the factual 
issues presented by appellant's lack of consent to the 
Stipulation and Judgment of July 23, 1971, and upon the 
factual issues posed by the terms of that Stipulation and 
Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Warren Patten 
Charles B. Casper 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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